

## SUDAN



### BASIC INFORMATION

<b>Population:</b>	36.2 million inhabitants (2005)
<b>GDP:</b>	27,699 million dollars (2005)
<b>GNI per capita:</b>	640 dollars (2005)
<b>HDI:</b>	0.516 (141 <sup>st</sup> ) (2004)

### BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

The civil war in the north and south began in 1983, although the conflict has its origin at the start of the country's postcolonial independence and is complex in nature, involving struggles for political power and natural resources, with religious and self-determination principles. Until the signing of the peace agreement in January 2006, this war had caused over two million deaths, four million internal displaced persons and over a half a million refugees, leading to one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world. With the north, the headquarters of the Government of Sudan, have fought the regular army - SAF (*Sudan Armed Forces*) and the PDF militias (*People's Defence Force*). In the south, the armed group known equally as SPLA or SPLM/A (*Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army*) has over the time of the conflict incorporated different opposition movements.

In addition, Sudan has an armed conflict in the region of Darfur (west), where there is a clash between the Government and pro-government militia, and the armed opposition groups SLM/A (*Sudan Liberation Movement/Army*) and the NMRD (*National Movement for Reform and Development*). There has been an increase in the confrontations between the two armed opposition groups, despite the fact that they are defending similar objectives. In addition, this conflict is acquiring a regional dimension with the clash between the Ugandan Armed Forces and the armed group LRA (*Lord's Resistance Army*) on both sides of the border between Sudan and Uganda.

### PEACE AGREEMENTS / PROCESS

**January 2005** saw the signing of the **Nairobi Peace Agreements** between the government and the SPLM/A, which established that from July 2005 the south of the country would become an autonomous region for a period of 6 years, during which time a referendum on self-determination would be held. The Ceasefire Agreements were signed in April of the same year.

The North's DDR Commission and the Council of Shara Arab tribes came to an agreement to prepare an MdE in relation with the collections of weapons in the region in July 2006. This memorandum laid the bases of the work between both parties under the principles of justice, cooperation, legal rapprochement, voluntary hand over, flexibility, synchronisation and transparency.

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In the region of Darfur, it is of special note that the Sudanese Government and the majority faction of the armed opposition group SLM/A signed an agreement on May 5<sup>th</sup> in Abuja (Nigeria), under the auspices of the AU, for disarmament and the demobilisation of the pro-government *Janjaweed* militias towards the middle of October 2006, as well as the restriction of movements of other militias such as the PDF; the integration of 4,000 ex-combatants into the Sudanese Armed Forces, of another 1,000 into the police force, and educational and training assistance for 3,000 troops. The **AMIS** (*African Union Mission in Sudan*) will be in charge of implementing this process.

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## INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

In June 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1547, creating **UNAMIS** (*UN Advance Mission in Sudan*). In March 2005, after having laid the bases for the deployment of a peace keeping mission as such, UNAMIS was transformed by Resolution 1590 into **UNMIS** (*UN Mission in Sudan*). The mandate of this mission, which is planned to be operative for a period of seven years, responds to that envisaged in the objectives of the Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 regarding the establishing of a DDR programme (with special attention to the needs of child soldiers and women), and includes the supervision and verification of the ceasefire agreement and the promotion of national reconciliation and human rights. The lack of infrastructure and the delay in contributing troops by the countries who committed themselves to do so, initially caused a certain delay in their deployment. In any event, by the beginning of 2007, UNMIS had 10,711 personnel in the country, among which there were 9,337 soldiers (of a maximum 10,000 agreed upon), 705 military observers, 669 police and over 2,000 civilians. The budget envisaged for the period between July 1<sup>st</sup> 2006 and June 30<sup>th</sup> 2007 is 1,126.3 million dollars.

In addition, due to the persistence of the conflict in the Darfur region, the **AU** maintains a presence of 7,000 troops, expanded at the end of September 2005, as a result of the AMIS operation. Among UNMIS's missions is that of also providing political and logistical support to AMIS, which has the additional logistical reinforcement of **NATO** troops.

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## DDR STRUCTURE

### **Background to the DDR process:**

Although an integrated DDR process has never been carried out in Sudan, a number of preparatory initiatives have been set up. In 1999, the IGAD Partner Forum established a Task Force to develop a planning framework for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of regions affected by the armed conflict in Sudan. The main aim of this Task Force was to support the peace process which at that time was being led by IGAD, with the idea of channelling support from the international community in order to guarantee the inclusion of both financial and social reconstruction as part of the peace agreements. The Task Force was also responsible for providing the donor community with advice, models and priorities during their intervention in the subsequent rehabilitation stage. Both the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A were aware of and had approved the terms of reference of this Task Force. One of the premises for the Task Force's operation was that without an effective DDR programme there would be no sustainable peace, given the risk of instability and continuing upsurges in violence in such a fragile context.

A number of programmes have been developed for child soldiers since then, and some of the children recruited by both the SPLA and the LRA have been successfully demobilised.

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### **Type of DDR:**

Multiple, with priority demobilisation for most vulnerable groups. It provides for the reintegration of ex-combatants on the basis of an elaborated SSR and political development process.

In Darfur, disarmament and demobilisation of militia and integration into the Armed Forces.

### **Enforcing bodies:**

The DDR programme is planned and evaluated by the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), while the implementation and coordination with UNMIS are carried out on a regional level by the countries north and south commissions (NDDRC and SDDRC, respectively). Offices have been established on the ground to facilitate the deployment of the personnel who have to run the programme in all the regions and states considered as having priority. The NGOs are recognised as acting bodies that can contribute in the coordination of the programme.

In August 2005, representatives of the NDDRCC, the SPLA, UNICEF and UNMIS met at UNDP central headquarters to debate the structures and the agreements established in the Peace Accord in matters concerning the DDR. This framework gave rise to the IDDRP (*Interim DDR Programme*), a programme for attending to the needs of child-soldiers, women and the disabled as a priority, to be developed together by UNMIS, the UNDP and UNICEF. In parallel, the overall DDR programme was designed and prepared for the rest of the combatants, with the aim of starting its implementation at the beginning of 2007.

### **Basic principles:**

The creation of a stable environment to ensure human security and support the social stabilisation process following the peace agreement, particularly in the south of the country, as well as to ensure a process of national reconciliation in the country, this being viewed as a trust-building measure. A review of the security system would lead to a reduction in military spending. There is also a need for the implementation of community security systems and the control of the weapons proliferation.

### **Strategic aspects of the programme:**

Following the establishment of structures for the coordination of national policy and the introduction of the programme in the north and south of the country, offices were established on the ground to facilitate the deployment of the personnel charged with running the programmes in the various regions and states regarded as requiring priority attention.

Against this background, an interim DDR programme has been set up (IDDRP) which, in conjunction with UNMIS, the UNDP and UNICEF, is aimed at providing priority attention for the requirements of child soldiers, women and the disabled. This is being undertaken at the same time as the global programme for the remaining combatants is being prepared.

### **Groups to be demobilised:**

The SAF will propose approximately 121,000 candidates for demobilisation, including its own members, those of the PDF and other related militia. The SPLA initially proposed the figure of 360,000 combatants for demobilising; however the final objective stands between 80,000 and 120,000. The number of militia associated with the SPLA to be demobilised is calculated to be 40,500.

### **Vulnerable groups:**

The Peace Agreement stipulates that child soldiers must be demobilised within a period of six months following its introduction, and the last stage should be reunification with the family. UNICEF and ICRC have been asked to work together on this process as well as War Child Holland (west of the country). The SPLA is thought to have between 9,000 and 11,000 child soldiers in its ranks. In any case, as mentioned earlier, the groups to be demobilised in during the first stage of the programme are the ones viewed as most vulnerable, which amount to a

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total of 24,500 people: **14,000 child soldiers, 1,000 women and 9,500 disabled people and the communities in which they are to settle** (this last group includes those suffering from HIV/AIDS).

The breakdown of child soldiers to be demobilised is as follows:

Armed group	Target demob. figure
SPLA and regular armed forces	7,000
Other armed groups	4,000
Former child soldiers	3,000

The types of activities planned for their reintegration are community-based. Various development activities are to be carried out; including educational opportunities, basic training, recreational activities, informal education and professional training that is relevant for the community.

The number of women combatants is estimated at 3,000. Among the various initiatives aimed at women are different kinds of training workshop about DDR, resolution of conflicts, HIV/AIDS prevention or awareness about gender-based violence. These activities have been aimed at women's organisations, with the desire being to strengthen their role in the future, and other groups such as the *Hakamas*, women who compose and sing for soldiers and militia.

The number of disabled soldiers in the SAF, PDF and pro governmental militias are around 5,000.

### Budget:

The total budget for IDDRP is **69.4 million dollars (between 2005 and 2007)**, of which 59.4 million is earmarked for 2006. UNMIS itself is covering 12.7 million dollars of this, while a further 12 million is being contributed by Japan (6.8 million), DFID (3.8), el CIDA-Canada (\$438,000) and UNDP/BCPR (1.5). An additional allocation of 15 million dollars has been promised by the EU. Of the total amount, 32 million dollars is assigned to the aid programme for child soldiers. UNICEF has asked for 10 million dollars as part of this allocation. The Government and the European Commission signed an agreement at the beginning of April 2006 to finance DDR programmes in the country to the tune of 16 million euros. These agreements form a part of the cooperation and development accords signed in November 2005.

### Timetable:

The peace agreement stipulates that DDR must extend to the 4 programmed stages over a period of 3 years (36 months) between 2005 and 2007. The programme finally began during September 2005.

### Other issues:

- **Justice:** During June 2005, the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, decided to launch an investigation into the situation in Darfur as a result of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
- **Security sector reform:** The Peace Accord establishes a provisional organisation of the Armed Forces until the holding of a referendum about self-determination in the south. During this period, the SNAF (*Sudan National Armed Forces*) will be made up of three groups:
  - The SAF (*Sudan Armed Forces*), deployed in the north and financed by the Government of National Unity.

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- The SPLA, deployed in the south, financed by the Government of Southern Sudan (with the possible assistance of the US Government by way of the private security firm DynCorp, which would have the job of training the SPLA).
- The JIUs (*Joint Integrated Units*), made up of some 40,000 members of both armies and financed by the Government of National Unity.

If South Sudan decides on secession, JIUs will be dissolved. On the opposite case, they will join the Sudanese Armed Forces. The South Sudanese police force is fairly small; consequently many SPLA ex-combatants have chosen to integrate into this body. This is a matter of concern, since they could use the force with partisan objectives, so one of the top priorities now is the reform and enforcement of the security sector.

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## DDR STAGES

In spite of the fact that the programme has still to be planned, the following aspects have been put forward for consideration:

### **Disarmament:**

The goal of reducing and controlling weapons is to be accompanied by a programme at both national and community level. Pilot intervention schemes are therefore going to be developed in 45 communities classified as high-risk, where local Peace and Security Committees will have to be created. This must not however detract from efforts to develop a national action plan for the control and reduction of weapons. The IDDRP has therefore established the target of disarming 10,000 people, including both members of armed groups and civilians. The arms control and community security programme has received financial support in the amount of half a million dollars from Canada.

In June 2006, the proposal was put forward to create disarmament forces among members of the SPLA, JIU, UNMIS and local police, and this began to be discussed by the Ministry of Local Government and Justice and the United Nations police.

### **Demobilisation:**

The programme for demobilising the most vulnerable groups began in September 2005, i.e. half a year later than envisaged by the peace agreements. To date some 900 child-soldiers have been demobilised. The first demobilisation episode, and that of greatest magnitude to date, took place in July 2006, when 242 under age soldiers who were members of the SPLA joined the DDR programme in a ceremony that took place in the state of Warab. The SPLA claims to have among its ranks between 9,000 and 11,000 minors, although UNMIS gives a total figure (both from the SPLA and its militias) of 4 to 5,000 child-soldiers, out of which 380 would have been already demobilised.

The Northern Commission has, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence, begun the demobilisation of 22,000 SAF combatants. For its part, UNMIS announced in March 2006 that 21,500 militia members had been integrated into the SAF and the SPLA, leaving another 19,000 troops still to be integrated.

The former head of the SLM urged the immediate disarming of the *Janjaweed* militia, insisting that insecurity was persisting in the country and that no effort had been made in this regard.

Officials of the Eastern Front, now considered as a political party, gave assurances at the beginning of February 2007 that there would be an imminent beginning of the demobilisation of ex-combatants in the east of the country, as part of the peace accord signed last October. It is calculated that some 1,800 troops will be demobilised in five holding camps.

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### ASPECTS TO BE EXAMINED

**Context:**

- National dimension to the conflict which cannot just be limited to the south of the country.
- Defective infrastructure throughout the country.

**Planning:**

- Absence of effective reintegration programmes.
- Concerns over the partial use of state institutions like the police and armed forces.

**Financing:**

- Lack of financing.

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### SOURCES

**International:**

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- SaferAfrica: *SaferAfrica Annex to Reference Paper for the Technical Working Group #1 meeting on Peace Agreements* (2005), at <<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/66/16d9d995.pdf>>.
- UNDP, at <<http://www.sd.undp.org>>.
- UNMIS, at <<http://www.unmis.org>>.

**Non-governmental:**

- ICG: *Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement*. Africa Briefing 39, June 2006, at <[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn\\_of\\_africa/b039\\_darfur\\_s\\_fragile\\_peace\\_agreement.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/b039_darfur_s_fragile_peace_agreement.pdf)>.
- Sudan Tribune, at <<http://www.sudantribune.org>>.

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